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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF
BOOK CENSORSH IP
By EVERETT E. SMITH, of the Denver Bar

Books share with our citizens and taxpayers the habit of
going to court. In the case of books the habit is less in-grained,
but with considerable frequency in recent years they have been
involved in litigation. They usually have the unenviable role of
defendant, the charge being obscenity.'
This is a brief report on the constitutional problems relating
to the censorship of books on the ground of obscenity. The
subject of obscenity itself, in a legal sense, is discussed only
insofar as necessary to illuminate the questions which arise under
the federal Constitution. The literary merit or lack of it in a
given book normally will affect any judgment on the issue of
obscenity, but as an independent factor it is, of course, entirely
beyond the scope of the present discussion. 2
The conflicting legal doctrines which have so far remained
unreconciled are these. On the one side is the constitutional principle of freedom of the press prescribed for the federal government by the First Amendment to the Constitution and for the
states by the same amendment plus the Fourteenth. Allied (n
the same side is the requirement of the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that statutory penalties
and prohibitions shall be expressed in definite terms. Opposing
the foregoing principles, which are designed for promoting the
public good by protecting private liberties, is the rule, intended
to promote the public safety or well-being in the opposite manner,
of restraining license, that a publisher or seller of obscene literature may be punished or the publication itself destroyed or otherwise penalized (denied carriage by mail, for example).
In the great garden of art, according to the elegant expression of Victor Hugo, there is no forbidden fruit. It seems
quite clear, at least for the present, that a comparable absolutism
does not inhere in the constitutional indulgence of the written
word. On a number of occasions the United States Supreme
Court has declared that the constitutional guarantee of the free'There have been other charges, of course. For example, SHELLEY'S QUEEx
resulted in the bookseller being charged with a blasphemous publication.
Queen v. Moxon, 4 St. Tr. (N. S.) 693 (1841). ToM PAINE'S RIGHTS OF MAN,
which criticized the British government, led to the author's prosecution for
seditious libel. Paine's Case, 22 How. St. Tr. 357 (1792).
2 Books charged with obscenity may vary greatly in merit. Among the accepted authors, not mentioned in the text, who have had a work questioned are
Tolstoy ((1890) 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 667); Flaubert (People v. Miller, (1935) 279
N. Y. S. 583); Gide (People v. Gotham Book Mart, ((1936) 285 N. Y. S. 563);
Voltaire (St. Hubert Guild v. Quinn, ((1909) 118 N. Y. S. 582); and a number
of classic authors (In re Worthington, ((1894) 30 N. Y. S. 361).
MAB
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dom of the press is not absolute.3 In a recent case concerning
group libel, Beauharnais v. Illinois,4 several justices of that tribunal- urged an absolute protection of expression, but their views
did not gain acceptance as law.
Back in 1948,. a bold prophet might have dared to predict
an authoritative determination by our highest court of the respective standings of the competing principles above mentioned.
New York's Court of Appeals had upheld a conviction of the publishers of Memoirs of Hecate County on the ground that one of
the stories in the book violated a state law forbidding the publication of obscene matter. 5 The New York court held that the
freedom of press guaranteed by the federal constitution did not
shield the publisher of the volume. The Supreme Court of the
United States agreed to hear an appeal from the decision of
New York's highest court, but, with one justice not participating,
the remaining justices divided equally, four to four, and affirmed
the state court's judgment without clarifying the law. 6
In January of last year the United States Supreme Court
again considered an appeal from a judgment of New York's Court
if Appeals.7 A motion picture rather than a book was involved.
The film entitled La Ronde was censored as "immoral" rather
than as "obscene" as in the case of the Memoirs of Hecate County.
The censorship of the film 'prevented its exhibition and did not
merely provide punishment after a showing. The Court did not
enter into a discussion of the film, but merely cited and followed
a prior judgment invalidating the advance censorship of a motion picture, The Miracle, as sacriligious.8
Some, at least, of the differences between the case of La
Ronde and that of the Memoirs of Hecate County are legally
inconsequential. There is no reason for supposing that motion
pictures enjoy greater constitutional protection than books; until recently it was not certain they enjoyed as much. The freedom of the press embodied in the First Amendment and mirrored
in the Fourteenth may have been intended primarily as a bulwark against that type of censorship which operates in advance
to prevent the publication of the written word, but it also limits
'Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949); Chaplinsky v. State of
New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); Cf. Justices Brandeis and Holmes concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927).
4343
U. S. 250 (1952).
5People v. Doubleday & Company, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 736 (App. Div. 1947),
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 77 N. E. 2d 6 (1947).
'335 U. S. 848 (1948).
Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of State of New York,
346 U. S. 587 (1954). which reversed 113 N. E. 2d 502 (N. Y., 1953).
'Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952). A state court has
held that a censorship of the same film, The Miracle, on the ground of obscenity
is constitutionally invulnerable. American Civil Liberies Union v. The City of
Chicago, 121 N. E. 2d 585 (Ill. 1954). The court was not required to state
whether or not it regarded the film as obscene; it directed the lower court to
decide that question.
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the punishment of publications already made.9 Indeed, punishment, particularly if heavy as when each sale of a book is a separate offense, may be an effective deterrent and thus a form of
advance censorship.
It is quite probable that the federal Supreme Court would
disapprove the punishment of one who sold the book on which
La Ronde was based if the seller were prosecuted under a state
statute for selling an "immoral" book. Would it equally disapprove a punishment if imposed under a statute relating to
"obscene" books? The highest court of New York sanctioned the
imposition of just such a punishment on the seller of an English
translation, Hands Around, of Reigen, the German-language book
on which the French film, La Ronde, was based. 10 It did so more
than twenty years ago, however, and much water has flown over
the dam since then.
Judging from the legal propositions which the Supreme Court
has developed in dealing with freedom of speech and press generally, the "risks" which are excepted from the general insurance
coverage of the First and Fourteenth Amendments are those
which present a substantial danger to the insurance company,
i.e., the body politic, whether federal or state government. In
many instances the Supreme Court has declared the danger to
It
the government or society must be "clear and present.""'
would not be wise to suppose, however, that no words other
than those quoted can be used to express the exceptions from
12
the policy insuring to each person the right to express his mind.
The important thing is that the danger must have been real, in
the opinion of Congress or the state legislature, and sufficiently
substantial to overbalance the great, nay vast, benefits which the
Founding Fathers expected, as a general proposition, from freedom of speech and press.
Several times the Supreme Court has expressed the idea that
obscene publications are beyond the scope of constitutional protection, are outlaws so to speak. 13 This would indicate a supposition of danger so formidable it can not be overcome by any words
of contrary tendency, but only by such drastic remedies as silencing the publisher by previous restraint or subsequent punishment,
destroying the publication, or by something relatively equivalent
to those specific measures (denying the book importation into this
country, for example). At the times of the respective utterances
9 Compare Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), with Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, supra, note 3 at 572.
10People v. Pesky, 243 N. Y. S. 193 (App. Div. 1930), affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, 173 N. E. 227 (1930).
"Terminiello v. City of Chicago, supra, note 3; West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943); Schenck v. United States, 249
U. S. 47, 52 (1919).
12See Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Pennekamp v. Florida,
323 U. S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
"Chaplinsky'v. State of New Hampshire, supra, at 572; and Near v. State
of Minnesota, sitpra, at 716.
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mentioned, however, the Supreme Court was not squarely confronted with the necessity of appraising the danger, if any, to
be feared from books charged with being obscene. Under the
circumstances, the remarks of the Court are obiter dictum and
not entitled to the same respect as statments made with relation
to points presented for decision.
The long history of prohibitions against and punishments for
obscene "libel" would be considered evidence of danger which
Congress and the state legislatures might credit. A case which
occurred in England prior to the American Revolution is conspicuous in the history of this subject. 14 It dealt with the colorful
character, John Wilkes, who was charged with publishing an
obscene and impious libel entitled An Essay on Woman. Following his conviction, and his outlawry for flight from the country,
Wilkes returned to England to be rewarded, on the one hand, by
election to parliament and, on the other, punished for his offending essay.
In some matters of law a page of history is worth a volume
of logic as Justice Holmes has remarked. It should not be supposed, however, that the long history of prohibitive legislation
would be controlling with respect to the sufficiency in a constitutional sense of the danger or evil inherent in obscene publications. The history, though evidence of the existence of a danger,
does not speak clearly with respect to the degree of it. In this
situation, the proximity and degree of danger is of vital importance.
The prevalence of federal and state statutes designed to
prohibit or penalize obscene publications likewise points to danger and can not be dismissed lightly. 15 The importance of this
factor, however, is offset wholly or partially by the haphazard
manner in which such laws have been applied. For example,
An American Tragedy and Lady Chatterly's Lover were struck
down in Massachusetts, but do not seem to have created a feeling
of impending disaster elsewhere. 16 Hands Around, as a book and
as a movie (La Ronde), appears to have been regarded as more
frightening in New York than in other jurisdictions. Joyce's
Ulysses, unsuccessfully attacked in the federal courts, apparently
was ignored by the various states. 17 Forever Amber, assaikd without success in Massachusetts, caused even less alarm in other
Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Repr. 327 (1770).
"5Federal statutes include 19 U. S. C. A. 1305 (prohibiting the importation
of obscene matter); 18 U. S. C. A. 1461 (exclusion of obscene matter from the
mails). See also Section 40-9-17 R. S. CoLo. 1953; section 524 of PENNSYLVANIA
PENAL CODE of 1939; section 1141 of NEW YORK PENAL LAW; and MASSACHU14

SETTS

GENERAL LAWS,

(Ter. ed.) Ch. 272, sec. 28C-28G.

"Commonwealth v. Friede, 171 N. E. 472 (Mass., 1930), and Commonwealth
v. Delacey, 171 N. E. 455 (Mass., 193'0).
United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F. 2d 705 (C. C. A. 2d
1934).
17
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jurisdictions. 8 Moreover, in Winters v. New York, decided in
1948, the prevalence of similar statutes did not save the New York
statute aimed at magazines which mass stories of crime. 19
The Supreme Court will be able to derive from the opinions
of the lower courts but little help or information concerning the
evils of publications said to be obscene. Few contain any discussion of the constitutional point. Such as do, speak a various
language. In upholding a judgment that the book, Strange Fruit,
is obscene, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts merely
remarked that the danger of corruption of the public mind is a
sufficient danger to settle the constitutional question. 2° In Pennsylvania a trial judge could see no clear and present danger that
Raintree County and Never Love a Stranger would incite readers
to criminal behavior and accordingly held the books within the
protection of the
Constitution, a decision later affirmed by a
21
superior court.
In one interesting case a federal appellate judge concurred
in the judgment of his colleagues that a certain book should be
excluded from the mails as obscene, but expressed considerable
bewilderment with respect to the general subject of obscenity,
including the danger to be feared. 22 The judge wrote:
Perhaps further research will disclose that, for most
men, such reading diverts from, rather than stimulates
to, anti-social conduct (which, I take it, is what is meant
by expressions, used in the cases, such as "sexual impurity", "corrupt and debauch the mind and morals").
23
suggestion has been made by a state court.
similar
A
It may well be that any obscenity in books intended for children, such as the so-called comics, would present a higher degree
of danger than would similar matter in books intended for the
general reading public. A distinction based on the intended user
of a book (comparable to the distinction observed in permitting
the sale of intoxicating beverages to adults, on the one hand, and
forbidding the sale thereof to minors, on the other) may be developed. As several judges have remarked, in effect, the entire
reading public should not be put at the mercy of the adolescent
mind or the feeblest conscience.2 4 Conversely, our children should
be protected from any reading which would be harmful to them,
if not to an adult.
"Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever Amber," 81 N. E. 2d 663
(Mass., 1948).
19333 U. S. 507 (1948).
"0Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 62 N. E. 2d 840 (Mass., 1945).
"1Commnowealth v. Gordon, 66 D. & C. 101 (Pa. Q. S. 1949), affirmed sub.
nom. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 70 A. 2d 389 (Super. Ct., Pa. 1950).
"'Roth v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d 788, 792-3 (C. A. 2d, 1949).
"Bantam Books v. Melko, 96 A. 2d 47, 61 (N. J.. 1953).
"9See United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S. D. N. Y., 1913), and
Commonwealth v. Gordon, supra. note 21.
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In the problematical future, therefore, the United States
Supreme Court may be faced with a number of difficult questions.
Do books such as those held obscene in the past-God's Little Acre,
for example-actually present a danger ?25 If so, what is the
danger-a vague, nebulous contamination of the public mind or
a specific, direct incitement to illegal or immoral behavior? How
great is the danger and how certain must it be in this connection
before the publication forfeits constitutional protection, that is,
becomes an excepted item from the insurance policy of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments?
A further difficulty will confront the Court from another
direction. Is a legislative or congressional reference to "obscene"
writings sufficiently definite to warn writers, publishers, booksellers, and other of the risk of criminal penalties or other adverse
consequences in dealing with books? The provisions and spirit
of the "due process" clauses of the Constitution require that state
and federal statutes prescribing penalties do so in fairly definite
terms. Thus, a statute prohibiting the sale of magazines of
"massed crime" is not sufficiently definite to be valid, as the
Supreme Court held in the Winters case mentioned earlier.2 6 Other
concepts which have been judicially labelled as too indefinite when
standing alone are "sacreligious" (The Miracle) and "immoral"

(La Ronde) .27
When a state or federal statute uses the word "obscene", it
usually does so in conjunction with other terms, such as "lewd,
lascivious, indecent." Even so, the various combinations of words
are far from conveying a wholly crtain meaning. True, it can
be said that they relate to sex and sexual desire and not to such
other human interests or desires as, say, the desire for property
or the lust for gain. It has been held, however, that books are
not ipso facto obscene or indecent by reason of episodes such as
narrated in Forever Amber or discussions such as contained in
Preparingfor Marriage.2 To what, then, does the term "obscene"
apply?
A state court decision handed down last year with respect
to a film, The Miracle, summed up obscenity as that having as
its calculated purpose or dominant effect the rousing of sexual
desires without compensating artistic or other merit. 29 The same
decision, however, equated the obscene with the immoral, and the
latter concept, as above mentioned, has been held too indefinite
to satisfy constitutional requirements. In the case of Bantam
Attorney General v. Book Named "God's Little Acre," 93 N.E. 2d 819 (Mass.,
1950). In New York the same book was not held obscene. People v. Viking
Press, 264 N. Y. S. 524 (1933).
"Note 19, supra.
"Cases cited in footnotes 8 and 7, respectively.
"Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever Amber," supra, note 18;
Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511 (D. C. App., 1945), and United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930).
"American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, supra, note 8.
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Books v. Melko, the court declared, "The definitions all lead to
the dead end of subjective determination," a view akin to that
expressed by Mr. Justice Black in his dissent in United States v.
Alpers, a case which involved phonograph records conceded to be
obsceneA0
The federal Court of Appeals for the Second District has
referred to the "imprecise judicial meaning of the statutory
terms," and Judge Frank's concurring opinion elaborates on the
point. 31 Another federal court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declared, "obscenity is not a technical term of
the law and is not susceptible of exact definition." That court,
with Judge, later Chief Justice, Vinson dissenting, refused to
become alarmed at a book by reason of the nudity of certain human
figures represented at an approximate height of one and a half
inches.32 On the West Coast a federal Court of Appeals found the
concept of obscenity sufficiently definite, declaring it observed no
contradiction
in testing obscenity by its tendency either to repel
33
or seduce.
Judge Learned Hand has compared a jury verdict of obscenity
to "a small bit of legislation ad hoc," but it is difficult to find
a guiding standard in this relation which is comparable in its
definiteness even to the rough standard of due care so much relied
upon in civil, accident litigation.3 4 More definiteness would seem
necessary in criminal cases which involve a person's constitutional
right of expression.
. In view of all the foregoing, the fate of various state and
federal statutes is shrouded in doubt, a factor which may dampen
the ardor of zealous prosecutors and postpone the eventual clarification of this branch of the law. Those censorious citizens who
are mindful of the damages later awarded against a complainant
whose charges against Madamoiselle de Maupin were turned down
by a jury, also
may be expected to proceed with caution in making
35
complaints.
In the meantime, it would be foolhardy to predict the manner
in which the foregoing questions eventually will be answered.
It would be inappropriate in an explanatory article of this nature,
as well as rash, to advocate a particular course as the one offering the best reconciliation of individual liberty and public security. Likewise there is no intention to advocate that in the constitutional scheme of things the public welfare is best served by
unrestricted individual freedom and that, therefore, there is no
conflict of public and private interest to be resolved. In this situation, advocacy is best left for the briefs of counsel when the questions are raised in litigation.
"See note 23, and 338 U. S. 680 (1949).
"Roth v. Goldman, supra, note 22.
f Parmelee v. United States, 113 F. 2d 729 (D. C. App. 1940).
Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142 (C. A. 9th, 1953).
"United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
"Halsey v. New York Society for Suppression of Vice, 136 N. E. 219 (1922),

